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Neutrality, Proselytism, and Religious Minorities at the 





I. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF PROSELYTISM 
 
The existence of every new, non-mainstream, or minority religious group depends 
on the ability to make its doctrines known and to proselytize new members. Only by 
persuading people to change their religious affiliation (or in case of atheists or 
agnostics, to adopt one for the first time) will a group be able to survive as a religious 
community. While minority religions may on occasion compete against each other for 
new adherents, for practical reasons, their main target group will be the membership 
of the majority religion, who may react by lobbying the legislature and the 
administration to impose restrictions on religious teaching by minorities. This is not 
only a contemporary phenomenon. Michael McConnell notes that in 18th century 
Virginia, the most intolerant of the colonies, the Church of England was the 
established church and the authorities blocked efforts by Presbyterians and Baptists to 
preach their faith.1 More recently, the prohibition of proselytism came before the 
European Court of Human Rights in Kokkinakis v. Greece.2
Kokkinakis is a seminal case, not only in its discussion of the issues of religious 
teaching and proselytism, but also for its discussion of freedom of religion in general. 
In the first case ever decided under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Strasbourg judges had the chance to spell out, for the first time, the 
principles governing religious freedom in the Convention context.    
 
                                                 
1 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1423 (1990). 
2 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397(1994) [hereinafter 
Kokkinakis]. 
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The applicant was an elderly Jehovah’s Witness living in the island of Crete. One 
day he visited one of his neighbors, who was the wife of the cantor of the local 
Christian Orthodox church, and engaged in a discussion about God with her. After 
her husband called the police, the applicant was arrested and charged with the 
criminal offense of proselytism. The offense was defined in the relevant Greek law as 
“any attempt to intrude on the religious beliefs of a person of a different religious 
persuasion, with the aim of undermining those beliefs, either by any kind of 
inducement or promise of an inducement or moral support or material assistance, or 
by fraudulent means or by taking advantage of his inexperience, trust, need, low 
intellect or naivety.”3  The applicant was convicted by the trial court and the judgment 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation. Kokkinakis 
complained before the Convention organs4
II. PROSELYTISM AT THE STRASBOURG COURT: FACIAL VS. "AS-APPLIED" 
INCOMPATIBILITY  
 of a violation of his right to religious 
freedom under Article 9 of the Convention, as well as violations of Articles 7 (no 
punishment without law) and 10 (freedom of expression).  
The European Court of Human Rights dismissed the claims under Articles 7 and 10, 
but upheld the complaint based on Article 9. It started its analysis by explaining the 
general principles on freedom of religion:  
 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one 
of the foundations of a 'democratic society' within the meaning of the 
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements 
that go to make up the identity of believers and of their conception of life, 
but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which 
has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. While religious 
freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also implies, inter alia, 
freedom to 'manifest [one's] religion.' Bearing witness in words and deeds is 
bound up with the existence of religious convictions. According to Article 9, 
freedom to manifest one's religion is not only exercisable in community with 
others, ‘in public’ and within the circle of those whose faith one shares, but 
can also be asserted ‘alone’ and ‘in private’; furthermore, it includes in 
principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for example through 
‘teaching,’ failing which, moreover, ‘freedom to change [one’s] religion or 
                                                 
3Anagastikos Nomos 1363/1938 §4 (1938) (Greece) (amended by Nomos 1672/1939 §2), cited 
in Kokkinakis, id. at 404. 
4 Before Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights came into force on 
November 1st, 1998, applicants had to lodge their complaints with the European Commission 
of Human Rights, which could then refer them to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Protocol No. 11 abolished the Commission and gave applicants direct access to the Court. 
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belief,’ enshrined in Article 9, would be likely to remain a dead letter.5
In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the criminal 




6 without specifying which aspect of the manifestation of religious beliefs 
was at stake. The Commission, similarly imprecise in its report, had referred to the 
applicant as having been convicted because “he was propagating his religious beliefs”7 
without examining whether this propagation was tantamount to teaching under 
Article 9(1).8
The Court then turned to the three requirements of Article 9(2). It asserted, 
without any detailed discussion, that the applicant’s criminal conviction was based on 
the relevant law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others. Thus, the Court upheld the facial validity of the challenged law and 
accepted that at least certain forms of proselytism could, in principle, be made 
criminal. However, the way the law was applied in the applicant’s case was 
unacceptable. The national courts had based their decision to convict him on a mere 
reproduction in their judgment of the relevant provision without specifying in what 
way he had tried to undermine his neighbor’s religious beliefs by improper means. 
The Court concluded that the criminal conviction was disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued and could not be considered necessary in a democratic society. 
Thus, according to the majority, there was nothing wrong as such with the law which 
criminalized proselytism, and any concerns with religious freedom did not extend 
beyond its specific application to the circumstances of the case.
 Yet, neither the Commission nor the Court left any doubt that the 
dissemination of one’s religious views and one’s attempt to engage in a conversation 
about them with another person fall within the ambit of the protected manifestations 
of religion. 
9
Kokkinakis is an elliptical judgment that leaves the reader with more questions 
than answers. Issues such as the importance of religious speech, the concept of the 
rights of others, the vague definition of the criminal offense of proselytism in the 
relevant statute, and the discriminatory treatment of religious minorities in relation to 
religious canvassing received very little if any attention. It is on this last issue that I 
will focus here. My starting point is the statement made by Judge Martens in his partly 
dissenting opinion that "making proselytism a criminal offence [emphasis in original] 
      
                                                 
5 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, at 418. 
6  Id. at 419. 
7  Id. at 411. 
8 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
its protocols art. 9(1), 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. (“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom . . . to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”). 
9 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, at 425, 432. Judge Pettiti, who partly concurred, and Judge Martens, 
who partly dissented, would have found the proselytism statute facially incompatible with the 
Convention. In a concurring opinion, Judge De Meyer appears to be taking the same view. Id. 
at 429 (“Proselytism, defined as zeal in spreading the faith, cannot be punishable as such.”). 
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would . . . run counter to the strict neutrality [emphasis added] which the State is 
required maintain"10.  The idea that the state should remain neutral in the field of 
religion is one that has played a central role in the development of doctrine and case-
law under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. I will argue that a proper 
understanding of and a commitment to neutrality in the context of Article 9 of the 
Convention would have required the Strasbourg Court to declare the proselytism 
statute challenged in Kokkinakis (or any statute similarly designed) incompatible on its 
face with the Convention, instead of merely holding that its application in the specific 
case was problematic.11
III. NEUTRALITY AS MINORITY PROTECTION 
 
One reason to prevent the state from dictating which forms of religious teaching 
are legitimate is the discriminatory potential inherent in such power. In general, 
governmental interference with religious affairs will be prone to yield majoritarian 
results reflective of the political influence of various religious groups. Mainstream 
faiths with a large number of followers can exert greater influence over the political 
process and thus have their religious needs, sensitivities and concerns taken into 
account by the legislature and administration. By contrast, minority groups, which 
frequently attract the disapproval or even the open hostility of religious majorities, 
have limited power in the context of majoritarian decision-making and can become 
easy targets.12 The principle of state neutrality, being a requirement of both the Free 
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, is often invoked by 
the United States Supreme Court as a safeguard against this eventuality.13 At its bare 
minimum, it prohibits the government from treating one religious group more 
favorably than another or religion more favorably than irreligion.14
                                                 
10 Id. at 437 (second emphasis added). 
 This definition, 
11 There is considerable literature on the distinction between facial and "as-applied" challenges 
to the constitutionality of statutes. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr, As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321 (2000); Michael C. Dorf, Facial 
Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994). For present purposes, it is 
enough to note that in a successful facial challenge, the court concludes not only that a specific 
application of a provision is unconstitutional, but that the provision is more generally invalid. 
12 Justice Scalia has admitted that leaving religious minorities to claim protection through the 
democratic process “will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not 
widely engaged in” but found this to be “an unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government”. Employment Division, Dep’t. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990). 
13 See, e.g., Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793-94 
(1973) (“A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels 
the State to pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ toward religion.”); School Dist. of Abbington v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“In the relationship between man and religion, the State is 
firmly committed to a position of neutrality.”).  
14 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion”). 
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however, provides insufficient guidance on how religious freedom disputes should be 
resolved, because it says very little about the substantive content of the principle. 
People may agree on their commitment to neutrality but at the same time have 
significantly differing views about what it requires in any given case.15
One way of approaching the normative content of the Religion Clauses is 
through a minority-protection angle.
 
16 In short, this is the view that free exercise and 
non-establishment should be interpreted as counter-majoritarian barriers to protect 
minority groups and faiths from the antipathy of the majority and/or the special 
burdens they may face because of otherwise general laws. Thus, their adherents are 
protected from being marked off as outcasts by official state action and their equal 
civic status is affirmed. Under such an interpretation, the state, in order to remain 
genuinely neutral, should not only refrain from directly targeting a minority religion; it 
should also take into account the impact its policies have on minority faiths and 
practices, given that by its very nature the democratic decision-making process tends 
to reflect the values and beliefs of the majority. Neutrality on all matters religious 
acquires particular value for those who, by reason of their religious affiliation are not 
(or not fully) within society’s mainstream.17  Equal treatment and the protection of 
minorities does not need to be the only or the most important principle underlying 
religious liberty, as it is perfectly conceivable (indeed, this is the better view) that a 
guarantee of the free exercise of religion and prohibition of establishment, as 
provided by the First Amendment, serves multiple values and purposes.18
In the majority of cases, the threat for minority denominations and their practices 
comes from general laws whose aims are secular, but which burden the religious 
adherent by requiring conduct that her religion prohibits or by prohibiting conduct 
that her religion requires.
 Instead, it 
should be seen as one of the various principles that inform our understanding of 
freedom of religion and the kind of governmental measures it requires or prohibits.       
19 It is only rarely that a law will single out and target a 
religious group or its practices as such. Church of Lukumi Bababu Aye Inc v. City of 
Hialeah20
                                                 
15 For a discussion of the various conceptions of neutrality and their place in the scholarship 
and case law on the Religion Clauses, see Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated 
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Michael McConnell, Neutrality Under 
the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 146 (1987).  
 provides the most characteristic recent example of a non-neutral law that 
16 See, e.g., Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their 
History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275 (2006); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919 (2004). 
17 See Laycock, supra note 15, at 998 (“That the government aspires to religious neutrality, and 
that the courts stand ready to hold government to its aspiration, is an important reassurance to 
religious minorities.”). 
18 See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND 
FAIRNESS 5 (2006) .  
19 See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 
(1996) (discussing laws that are technically neutral but that nonetheless place “incidental 
burdens” on the exercise of rights).  
20 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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infringes on the freedom of religion of a minority group. The case concerned various 
city ordinances prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals which was central to the 
worship of the Santeria religion. The Supreme Court held that the contested 
provisions violated the First Amendment as they failed to meet the requirements of 
neutrality and general applicability and did not serve any compelling secular interests. 
In relation to neutrality, Justice Kennedy noted that a law which restricts conduct 
because of its religious motivation cannot be neutral.21 Although the text of the 
ordinances did not conclusively point to the lack of any legitimate secular interest, the 
effect of the law had to be taken into account when assessing its real object, and, in 
the present case, it was clear that, in practice, the only killings of animals caught by 
the ordinances were the Santeria sacrifices.22 Further evidence of the measures’ 
improper object was their over-inclusiveness as they “[proscribed] more conduct than 
[was] necessary to achieve . . . the legitimate governmental interests in protecting the 
public health and preventing cruelty to animals.”23 At the same time, the ordinances 
were also found to be under-inclusive and not generally applicable in relation to both 
aims: on the one hand, they left unpunished various instances of animal killings for 
non-religious purposes; on the other, they did not provide for the protection of public 
health from animal carcasses when the killing had secular motives.24
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia, while agreeing that the ordinances did not 
pass First Amendment scrutiny, disapproved of the part of the majority opinion 
where Justice Kennedy examined the legislative history of the ordinances, which 
clearly showed the hostility of the residents and the members of the city council 
toward the Santeria faith, to infer that the lawmakers’ intention was to target this 
particular group. He stated that the subjective motives of legislators were irrelevant, 
the only pertinent criterion being the object of the laws at issue.
 
25 This is a test of 
legislative aims–a measure will be unlawful if it is directed at constitutionally protected 
conduct.26
IV. DISCRIMINATION IN TEXT AND PRACTICE: EXAMINING KOKKINAKIS 
 It does not inquire into the motives and purpose of government actors. 
Thus, for Justice Scalia, it was the objective fact that the ordinances targeted a 
particular religious practice that mattered, with the possible evil motives of city 
officials being neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for invalidation. 
In Lukumi, Justice Kennedy noted that the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” used in 
the Hialeah ordinances may be susceptible to a secular use. Yet, the anti-proselytism 
statute in Kokkinakis lacked even this guise of neutrality, as it was formulated in purely 
religious terms and singled out religious activity for unfavorable treatment. Put 
                                                 
21 Id. at 533. 
22 Id. at 534-36. 
23 Id. at 538. 
24 Id. at 544-45. 
25 Id. at 558-59 (Scalia J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
26 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term: Foreward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 54, 73 (1997). 
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differently, the Greek law lacked any secular justification, prohibiting, in express 
language, “conduct because it [was] undertaken for religious reasons.”27 Given that 
the anti-proselytism statute clearly targeted religious activity, the text could (and 
should) have been the starting and final point of the European Court’s scrutiny.28
One could try to circumvent the neutrality problem by arguing that a statutory 
prohibition of religious activity is not necessarily suspicious – that what really matters 
is whether the statutory classification is formulated in neutral terms, so that it relates 
to religion in general, rather than to a specific religion. The anti-proselytism law in 
Kokkinakis, the argument could say, singles out a kind of religious conduct without 
reference to any particular faith. Thus, any act of proselytism falling within the ambit 
of the law would be treated evenhandedly, regardless of the specific religious belief 
which prompted it.    
 It is 
unnecessary to inquire into the motives of the lawmakers or the administrators, since 
the impugned law explicitly made a religious classification to impose a burden on a 
specific activity because it was undertaken for religious purposes. This deprives the 
law of any credible claim to neutrality. A minimalist, textual approach, of the type 
usually favored by Justice Scalia, would have been enough to find the statute invalid 
on its face. 
Even if one were to accept this argument – rejecting the view that the statute’s 
religious classification renders it non-neutral and arguing instead that only 
discrimination explicitly sanctioned by the text of the impugned proselytism law is 
subject to a facial challenge – the statute in Kokkinakis still fails to pass the American 
constitutional muster addressed in Lukumi. For textual neutrality does not exhaust the 
court’s constitutional scrutiny; rather, it is the starting point of a neutrality inquiry that 
defines the way a textually neutral law is applied. As Justice Kennedy explained: 
 
Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the 
Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause 
forbids subtle departures from neutrality and covert suppression of particular 
religious beliefs. Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive 
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of 
facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental 
hostility which is masked as well as overt. 29
 
 
The history of the application of the proselytism statute in Kokkinakis leaves no 
doubt as to its real object and the lack of any credible claim to neutrality and 
evenhandedness. The applicant, since becoming a Jehovah’s Witness in 1936, had 
                                                 
27 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532 
28 See id. at 533 (stating that in order “to determine the object of a law, we must begin with its 
text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law 
lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable 
from the language or context”).   
29 Id. at 534 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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been “arrested more than 60 times for proselytism,” interned by the administrative 
authorities and convicted by the criminal courts. Between 1975 and 1992, 4,400 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested; 1,233 of whom were committed for trial while 208 
were convicted.30 On the other hand, the government was unable to refer to any cases 
where individuals were prosecuted for proselytism directed against religions other 
than the dominant Christian Orthodox, let alone cases where members of the 
dominant religious group were prosecuted for efforts to convert adherents of 
minority faiths.31
As Judge Martens explained in his dissenting opinion, “under the Convention all 
religions and beliefs should, as far as the State is concerned, be equal…making 
proselytizing a criminal offense would not only run counter to the strict neutrality which 
the State is required to maintain in this field but also create the danger of 
discrimination when there is one dominant religion. The latter point is tellingly 
illustrated by the file that was before the Court.”
 It is clear that not only the potential for discrimination was inherent 
in the contested law, but that its actual operation was so obviously discriminatory that 
it could not withstand the most feeble neutrality scrutiny on the basis of application.  
32 Because the Greek proselytism 
statute overtly targeted religion by singling out and punishing a particular religious 
activity,33 with the aim of protecting the majority religion and impeding the efforts of 
other faiths to disseminate their doctrines, the European Court of Human Rights 
should have declared it incompatible with the Convention on its face. Instead, 
contrary to the Lukumi Court, it failed even to discuss its practical application, and 
seems to have accepted that the statute’s facial neutrality was enough to save it. Yet, 
the acceptance of a facial challenge would not have required any kind of judicial 
activism by the European Court; a minimalist approach focused on the effect of the law 
under review, like the one espoused by Justice Scalia in Lukumi,34
 
 would have 
sufficed.           
 
                                                 
30 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, at 399, 406 (listing these statistics, which are provided to the 
European Court of Human Rights by the applicant and undisputed by the Government). 
31 See id. at 431 (Valticos J., dissenting, who voted against the finding of a violation of the 
Convention, and in a rather unconvincing effort to justify the fact that all prosecutions and 
convictions were aimed at the protection of the dominant religion, argued that this was 
reasonable since the majority of the population were Orthodox Christians and thus were 
targeted by minority groups: “Admittedly, the Government’s representative was not able to 
give concrete evidence concerning other religions, but that is not surprising since the 
Orthodox religion is the religion of nearly the whole population and sects are going to fish for 
followers in the best-stocked waters”).  
32 Id. at 437 (Martens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).    
33 See GREENAWALT, supra note 18, at 42 (asserting that a statute targets religion if it explicitly 
or implicitly singles out a religious activity). 
34 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, 
stating that “[the] First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which legislators enact 
laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted”).   
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V.  GERRYMANDERING AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
An important aspect of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lukumi is the idea that 
Hialeah’s ordinances constituted a form of “religious gerrymandering” in that they 
constituted “an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious 
practices.”35 For instance, the ordinances carefully proscribed activities related to 
certain religious groups, while sparing activities practiced by others. The Court’s 
concern about religious gerrymandering not only relates to individual religious liberty 
but also equality among religious groups.36 When the state expresses hostility towards 
a particular religious group, either by adopting overtly discriminatory measures or by 
more subtle gerrymanders, it puts into question the equal civic status of its members. 
In other words, it fails to recognize them as equal members of the community.37
In Lukumi, the statements of various city officials recorded in the minutes of 
meetings of the city council are a telling example of how the antipathy that a majority 
of the population may feel towards a minority group can easily translate into state 
action against the minority group. The president of the council asked: “What can we 
do to prevent the Church from opening?”; one councilman said that in pre-revolution 
Cuba “people were put in jail for practicing this religion”; another stated that the 
Santeria devotees “are in violation of everything this country stands for”; a third 
councilman expressed that “I don’t believe the Bible allows [the sacrifice of animals]”; 
the chaplain of the local police department found the Santeria religion to be a 
“foolishness”, “an abomination to the Lord”; and the city attorney concluded that 
“this community will not tolerate religious practices which are abhorrent to its 
citizens.”
   
38
What is the picture that emerges from these statements and the ordinances that 
followed? On the one hand, there is a dominant group of citizens which expresses its 
religious sentiments through mainstream choices and takes itself to be the 
representative of the true and proper values of the community. On the other, there is 
a religious minority whose beliefs and practices are seen not merely as different or 
   
                                                 
35 Id. at 535 (stating that “[the] Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of 
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders” (citing Walz v. Tax 
Comm’r of New York City 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970))). While measures adopted with a view of 
disadvantaging a religious group will violate the Free Exercise Clause, those that aim at 
favoring a religious group will amount to impermissible religious gerrymandering which 
violates the Establishment Clause. See Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School 
District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 729 (1994) (invalidating the creation of a special school 
district for a religious community and asserting that “[there] is no serious question that the 
legislature configured the school district with purpose and precision, along a religious line.” 
This explicit religious gerrymandering violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause”).   
36 See Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections on Lukumi, 69 TUL. L. 
REV. 335, 350 (1994); Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that “[neutrality] 
in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis"). 
37 See Karst, supra note 36, at 355.  
38 Lukumi, 508 U.S at 541-42. (quoting taped excerpts of Hialeah City Council Meeting, June 9, 
1987). 
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even bizarre but as irreconcilable with these dominant values and the forms of 
religiosity they permit. Participation in such a minority religion places the believer not 
just in the fringe of society but outside the community altogether. In 1942, Louis 
Lusky noted that,  "such dislike [against minorities] arises not because the members of 
the groups have done or threatened acts harmful to community, but because 
membership in the group is itself considered a cause for distrust or even hostility."39
In its effort to unearth religious gerrymandering, Justice Kennedy explained, the 
Court may rely on “both direct and circumstantial evidence…Relevant evidence 
includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under 
challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in 
question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous 
statements made by members of the decision-making body.”
 
40
The statute was enacted by a dictatorial government in 1938 and constituted part 
of a series of legislative measures directed against dissenters. For instance, during the 
inter-war years Jehovah’s Witnesses had been convicted not only under the 
proselytism statute but also contemporary statutes for the “prevention of 
communism” and for the “preservation of social order.”
 I have suggested that 
in Kokkinakis, a restrained, minimalist approach, focusing on the object of the 
proselytism statute without an examination of the motivation of the lawmakers or its 
legislative history, would have given the European Court of Human Rights sufficient 
grounds to declare the law incompatible with the Convention on its face. The 
argument for incompatibility would only be further strengthened if we look into the 
statute’s background and history.  
41
At the Commission stage, the evidence presented by the applicant on the statute’s 
history and background led Commissioner Frowein to note in his partly dissenting 
opinion: “It is not disputed that the legislation was originally designed to protect the 
Orthodox Church.”
 The group was seen as 
dangerous for the state and its established church and was subjected to officially 
sanctioned persecution alongside groups that posed similar threats, albeit on non-
religious grounds.   
42 In assessing the governmental policy supporting the statute and 
the climate in which it was adopted, Commissioner Frowein performed an exercise 
similar to the one conducted by Justice Kennedy in Lukumi; the rule under scrutiny 
was placed in its historical and social context so as to demonstrate the real objectives 
of the legislator and its effects on specific groups.43
Now, what does this contextual inquiry reveal about the proselytism statute in 
Kokkinakis? I think it leaves no doubt that the prohibition of proselytism was a form 
of religious gerrymandering, in the sense that, although it did not expressly target by 
name a particular group, it imposed a targeted burden on the basis of religious 
  
                                                 
39 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1942). 
40 Lukumi, 508 U.S at 540. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 266-68 (1977)). 
41 Kokkinakis, supra note 2, at 406-07. 
42 Id. at 416. 
43 See Karst, supra note 36, at 348. 
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affiliation. The hostility of both the state and a large segment of society toward 
Jehovah's Witnesses led to the enactment of a rule, which directly and intentionally 
harmed the aspect of the free exercise of religionreligious canvassing and 
solicitationthat is the hallmark of their practice. Given this hostile treatment, 
Jehovah's Witnesses would qualify for the type of judicial protection envisaged by 
Justice Stone for "discrete and insular minorities" in footnote four of Carolene 
Products.44 When prejudice against these vulnerable groups makes it impossible for 
them to rely on the political process for to protect their rights, it is appropriate for the 
courts to subject governmental measures to a more exacting scrutiny. The minority 
groups referred to by Justice Stone are not merely the losers in a political struggle; 
they are the habitual losers whose insularity means that majoritarian processes cannot 
be trusted to protect their members.45
Indeed, in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
   
46 decided two years after Carolene 
Products, Justice Stone recognized that Jehovah's Witnesses were a "discrete and 
insular minority" in need of protection by the courts.47 The case concerned a 
challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses to a school rule requiring all pupils to salute the flag. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter conceded that the rule affected a right of 
profound importance for the individualfreedom of conscience and religionbut 
held that courts were not the appropriate arena to debate issues of educational policy 
"so long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open."48
 
 In his 
dissent, Justice Stone pointed out that when the Court refrains from passing upon 
legislation where it may be possible for affected individuals to have recourse to the 
political process, it: 
[S]urrender[s] the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities 
to the popular will…Here we have such a small minority entertaining in 
good faith a religious belief, which is such a departure from the usual 
course of human conduct, that most persons are disposed to regard it with 
little toleration or concern.49
 
 
In the first decades of the 20th century, Jehovah's Witnesses faced widespread 
prosecution both from state authorities and private people.50
                                                 
44 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 While, in theory, the 
claimants in Minersville could have lobbied the administration and the legislature on 
the issue of the flag salute requirement, in reality, their position in the political 
45 Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 
1296 (1982). 
46 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
47 See Berg, supra note 16, at 934-35. 
48 Minersville, 310 U.S. at 599. 
49 Id. at 606 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
50 See Berg, supra note 16, at 934. 
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community was so marginal and weak that it would have been unreasonable to expect 
the political branches of government to lend an objective, let alone a sympathetic ear, 
to their requests. Therefore, it was appropriate and necessary for courts to step in and 
offer them the constitutional protection the political process denied them.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
An analysis that takes into account a minority group's distinct position in a 
community and its possible vulnerability, such as the one employed by Justice 
Kennedy in Lukumi, requires the consideration of the equal protection aspect. This 
element is conspicuously absent from the judgment of the majority in Kokkinakis. 
Although the applicant had submitted evidence demonstrating both the lack of 
neutrality in the conduct of the state towards Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
government’s clear hostility to and persecution of the group's members, the 
Kokkinakis majority did not consider this relevant for the assessment of the statute's 
facial compliance with religious freedom. Consequently, the law that had served as the 
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51 In a later case concerning the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to establish places of worship, 
the European Court of Human Rights did acknowledge that the authorities were using existing 
legislation to restrict their religious activities: "It appears from the evidence and from the 
numerous other cases cited by the applicants and not contested by the Government that the 
State has tended to use the possibilities afforded by the above-mentioned provisions [on the 
establishment of places of worship] to impose rigid, or indeed prohibitive, conditions on 
practice of religious beliefs by certain non-Orthodox movements, in particular Jehovah's 
Witnesses. Admittedly, the Supreme Administrative Court quashes for lack of reasons any 
unjustified refusal to grant an authorisation, but the extensive case-law in this field seems to 
show a clear tendency on the part of the administrative and ecclesiastical authorities to use 
these provisions to restrict the activities of faiths outside the Orthodox Church." Manoussakis 
v. Greece, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 387, 408 (1996).  This is the first time that the Court stated that 
an administrative practice in general, as opposed to a specific application of a legislative 
provision, gave rise to concerns about religious freedom and the ability of minority faiths to 
practice their beliefs. 
